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Abstract
Women in the finance industry have long been underrepresented. The mutual fund
industry is no exception, with female managers in the United States falling stagnant at only 11%
from 2000 to 2019. Given this low and stagnant number, this study seeks to understand if female
managers impact mutual fund performance, specifically comparing down and up market periods.
The data for this research was compiled from individual US mutual fund prospectus and fact
sheet information in order to create a unique dataset containing the returns for every year
between 2000 and 2019 as well as gender make-up, average experience, and team size of each
management team. The funds in this data set include equity, fixed income, and blended
portfolios. It is necessary to understand the performance of mutual funds as despite their
continual underperformance in comparison to other actively managed investment classes, they
remain a large industry. This study finds that gender is not a cause of this underperformance and
therefore not a rational component for deciding management team makeup. These findings are
consistent with previous literature that found no impact on performance due to gender in
European equity mutual funds.
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1. Introduction
Traditionally, the asset management industry is a field dominated by men (Morris, 2020).
This is particularly noticeable in the mutual fund industry, which consistently has low
percentages of female managers. In both 2000 and 2019, the average percentage of female
mutual fund managers measured globally was only 14% and was even smaller in the United
States where it was 11% in both these years (Lallos 2020). In the finance industry overall, there
has been a growth in the number of women and people of color who enter asset management.
Some firms have begun to actively diversify their workforce through participation in both
internal directives, as well as programs organized by organizations such as Girls Who Invest or
Seizing Every Opportunity (SEO) which give college students experience in the asset
management industry. This industry often focuses on finding a “trading edge” which describes “a
technique, observation or approach that creates a cash advantage over other market players”
(Farley 2020). This trading edge is developed through unique experiences and perspectives that
allow an investor to see opportunities in the market where others do not. It is possible that
diversity and growth in perspectives has the potential to help firms find promising new
investments and increase their financial returns. This has helped influence the decision to
increase their diversity.
The actively managed mutual fund industry is in particular need of such potential. This
industry has long underperformed in comparison to other subfields of asset management, as well
as benchmarks such as the S&P 500. Due to this underperformance, over the years actively
managed mutual funds have lost investors to these other forms of investing (Pastor, Vortaz
2020). However, the niche remains large, manages tens of trillions of dollars, and is still
attractive to investors due to the allocation of assets held by mutual funds. The
1

underperformance relative to other industries demonstrates a necessity to study what factors
contribute to financial performance – both positively and negatively. It is important for firms to
understand what factors influence returns for their funds in order to potentially make changes to
improve their performance. In particular, studying mutual funds during recessions and bear
markets can provide useful information in regard to what factors correlate with strong returns.
Understanding what allows certain mutual funds to perform better than others reveals what
factors are important to positive returns during both times of financial crisis and financial
growth.
This thesis adds to the research on how female managers impact financial performance in
the mutual fund industry. Specifically, I investigate how mutual funds with female managers
differ from those that have no female managers, as well as analyze the way percentages of
female managers on a team may impact returns. My efforts differ from previous research by
analyzing a random sample of mutual funds from equity, fixed income, and blended asset classes
during recessions and bear markets. I analyze what are the most significant factors in a mutual
funds’ ability to generate high returns, particularly during bear markets. Previous research has
not considered how mutual funds perform during recessions in relation to structural
characteristics such as percentage of female managers on the management team. I argue that by
studying the industry in times of an unexpected economic shock, managers’ skills are truly
tested, and the returns of their fund will reflect all benefits or deficits they bring to the table.
This paper helps generate a greater understanding of mutual fund performance and
characteristics in the United States over the last two decades. By comparing how the percentage
of female managers as well as other structural characteristics of funds impact returns to the
consistently low levels of female managers, I will investigate if the industry is acting rationally
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and in its own self-interest. If female managers are a positive factor on firm performance,
especially during crises such as recessions, then as rational actors firms should have been
increasing the levels of female managers and moving forward would be incentivized to consider
hiring more female managers. There has been much work in behavioral finance to explain why
firms do not always act as rational actors. Kahneman and Tversky in their seminal work found
that individuals had inconsistent preferences, which they used to develop an alternative theory of
decision making under risk (Kahneman, Tversky 1979). This laid the groundwork for further
research, particularly by Richard Thaler, who was able to demonstrate through series of
experiments, that what he calls nudges effect the choices people make, something that would not
happen to rational economic agents (Thaler 2018). The fact that firms do not act as rational
agents could be used to explain why the mutual fund industry as a whole has not increased its
percentages of female managers if it is shown that they are a statistically significant positive
impact on returns.
My research contributes to the current literature in several ways. First, recent
developments in diversity of firm ownership demonstrates larger trends that I will study within
the mutual fund industry. From 2011 to 2017 there has been an upward trend of Assets Under
Management (AUM) by women owned firms. In terms of financial performance, there was no
statistical difference in diverse owned firms and non-diverse owned firms during this time, with
diverse being defined as either owned by women or people of color (Lerner 2017). It is important
to note that this research looked at ownership and not management. A study of European
diversified equity mutual funds and gender also found no significant difference in the financial
performance of funds managed by women compared to men (Babalos, Caporale, Philippas). The
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European study focuses on Europe and on gender in mutual funds that invest in equity, as
opposed to fixed income or other possible asset allocations.
Since mutual funds are publicly traded, data on management characteristics are publicly
available. Management characteristics encompasses gender, industry experience, and team size. I
use the gender of the managers to create a percentage of each management team of female
managers. Similarly, I use industry experience to create an average team experience for each
management team. I also collect data on returns for each individual fund collected on December
31st of each year from 2000 to 2019. In order to control for differences in structural asset class
allocation, I collected data on the percentage breakdown of where assets are allocated in terms of
equity, cash/cash equivalence, and fixed income. All of this data is publicly available on the fact
sheets and websites of each firm that owns the mutual funds. Finally, I collected the historical
returns of the S&P 500 and the three-month US-Treasury Bill for use in the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM), which is used to measure the returns against the appropriate benchmarks.

2. Literature Review
In this section I review the existing literature on women’s participation both in the labor
force overall as well as their impact in the finance industry. In addition, I review literature
examining the behavior of mutual funds during and around a financial crisis, focusing on the
relationship between the participation of women as managers in the mutual fund industry to
returns during down markets such as financial crises.

2.1. Women’s Participation in the Labor Force
From the early 1920s until the present, women’s labor force participation has consistently
been growing. In 1920, married women first began to join the workforce in noticeable numbers,
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starting a period of expansion that lasted until the 1960s (Goldin, 2014). Through the 1940s, an
increased demand for clerical work and an increased supply of high school graduates further
grew the number of women participating in the labor force. Periods of evolutionary change
began to level out towards the end of the 1960s due to several factors such as the decreased
stigma of working married women, the end of marriage bars, and the creation of part-time
employment which pushed women’s participation to its highest points. Yet despite these
increases in labor force participation, women’s income remained below that of their male
counterparts. The fact that men were more likely to plan out future careers in their youth could
account for this disparity (Goldin 2006).
At the same time, women’s educational possibilities began to expand, making them more
qualified to become participants in parts of the labor force that were previously inaccessible due
to educational barriers. Yet, even with women’s educational and skill levels beginning to match
those of men, participation in the labor force plateaued in the 1990s and today remains low in
certain fields. Women simply are not engaged in the same professions at the same numbers as
men. This suggests additional barriers to entry that are not related to barriers in access to
education and skill training. One argument for this has been that change must occur in the labor
market itself, specifically relating to the ways that jobs are structured and the flexibility of labor
hours. Currently, firms have an incentive to reward workers who are able to work long and set
hours. This disproportionately affects the ability of women to participate in occupations that
demand such structure, due to constraints such as childcare (Goldin 2014).
This disproportionate labor force participation between men and women can and often
does negatively impact firms. In recent decades, diversity and inclusion have become standard
corporate strategies. However, it is not simply for social justice reasons that businesses engage in
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these practices. Diversity is increasingly being understood as a competitive advantage,
specifically as an important way to create growth (Hunt, Yee, Prince, Dixon-Fyle 2018). In 2014,
companies in the top quartile of gender diversity for executive teams were 15% more likely to
experience profitability that was above average than companies in the fourth quartile. The
expanded 2017 study demonstrated a 21% likelihood that continued to be statistically significant
(Hunt, Yee, Prince, Dixon-Fyle 2018). Additionally, more women executives in line roles
(revenue generating) is closely correlated with financial outperformance, even while women
continue to be underrepresented in these roles (Krivkovich, Robinson, Starikova, Valentino, Yee
2017; Hunt, Yee, Prince, Dixon-Fyle 2018). Board diversity is also correlated with financial
performance. A study using 1993 and 1998 financial performance data and the percentage of
women and minorities on boards of directors of the 127 largest US companies found that board
diversity is positively associated with the firm’s financial performance (Erhardt, Werbel, Shrader
2003). Simply the presence of a woman on a team creates better performance in terms of sales
and profits (Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, and van Praag 2013).
In the case of mutual funds two studies, one released in 2017 and one released in 2019
discuss diversity in the context of firm ownership. Women owned firms have seen an upward
trend in Assets Under Management (AUM) from 2011 to 2017 (Lerner 2017). This upward trend
in women ownership is at odds with the percentage of women management of mutual funds,
which has remained at 14% from the end of 2000 to the end of 2019 (Morningstar). Both the
2017 and 2019 studies found that there was no statistical difference in diverse owned firms and
non-diverse owned firms in terms of financial performance (Lerner 2017, 2019). This finding is
consistent with other studies of mutual fund managers and gender diversity. One analysis
focused specifically on European diversified equity mutual funds found that there was no
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significant difference in the financial performance measured by returns of funds managed by
women compared to men (Bablos, Caporale, and Philippas 2015). All three of these studies
support a general trend in the literature that there is no significant statistical difference in
performance of mutual funds between female and male managers. In another important angle,
Baer, Niessen-Ruenzi, Ruenzi (2009) investigate diversity defined by education, gender, tenure,
and age. The study focuses on the effect of team diversity on mutual fund performance and finds
that a tradeoff exists between information gains and communication costs. In teams that are
educationally and tenure diverse, information gains were strong, however in gender diverse
teams, communication costs dominate. This focus on team performance is due to the fact that
funds are increasingly being managed by a team, rather than by a single manager.

2.2. Mutual Funds and Financial Crises
My research centers around the impact of female managers on performance during downmarkets. While there has not been research on how female managers impact returns during
recessions, there is literature about the impact of recessions on mutual fund returns. A study of
the 2008 financial crisis and mutual funds examined the behavior of managers in their financial
performance in comparison to benchmark indices. In general, mutual fund managers who
actively picked stocks outperformed managers who were secretly matching their funds to
indexes. This pattern held true during the 2009 financial crisis. However, all mutual funds were
hit severely during the 2008 financial crisis, leading to general underperformance compared to
previous years with a strong recovery in 2009 (Petajist0 2018). This literature demonstrates that
down-markets and their recovery periods offer a useful point of analysis to compare the impact
of managers on returns. My paper expands on this literature to analyze if the gender of managers
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impacts the returns of mutual funds during moments of economic downturn such as the 2008
financial crisis.

3. Theory
Mutual funds are important parts of investors’ portfolios. Mutual funds can be purchased
by any investor – either through a brokerage or directly from an investment firm that operates
mutual funds. Because they can be purchased by anyone, they are registered with and regulated
by the SEC who requires a certain level of information about their financial status to be
published quarterly. Mutual funds can invest in any combination of stocks, bonds, and other
assets. They also typically hold some amount of cash that is not invested. The mutual funds
discussed in this paper are all actively managed, meaning they are run by managers who make
trading decisions based on market analysis and are not simply buying holdings to match indexes
such as the S&P 500. Funds that seek to match indexes are called passively managed funds and
are not analyzed in this paper. Actively managed funds attempt to generate higher returns for
their investors than one would get with a fund that matched indexes. These higher returns allow
for actively managed funds to justify their management fees. Structurally, mutual funds pool
together cash generated by investors purchasing a stock of the mutual fund, allowing for greater
diversification as well as reducing the information and trading costs that investors would incur if
they invested on their own. This diversification helps protect investors who buy mutual funds
from losses that occur in bear markets and recessions. It is during these recessions and bear
markets that actively managed mutual funds are put to the test and should rise to the occasion.
Earning extra-normal returns in financial markets is rare, especially for active traders
(Barber, Lee, Liu, Odean, Zhang, 2017). Investors view this success in financial markets as
driven by trading edge, which is the specific ways in which a fund, firm, or individual utilizes a
8

difference from others in order to notice opportunities in the market that others do not (Forbes
2020). The main opportunity to make money in financial markets is to find stocks whose listed
value on the stock market is below an analyzed target price that represents the true value of the
stock (Baresa, Bogdan, Ivanovic 2013). The edge that a firm, fund, or individual brings to better
analyze price targets and find opportunities in the market is another important part of driving the
returns that justify the fees that come with actively managed funds.
As discussed previously, there were no statistically significant effects of women
managers on returns in various fund sectors and global regions. However, there is a distinct gap
in the literature about potential impacts women may have during recessions and bear markets.
Recessions are defined as two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth. In financial
markets, bear markets are typically described as a market atmosphere of widespread pessimism
and negative investor sentiment that causes securities prices to fall 20% or more (Investopedia,
2020). Over the past twenty years – from 2000 to 2019 – in the United States there have been
two recessionary periods and four clear moments of a bear market. The 2001 Dot-Com Bubble
and the 2007-2009 Housing Crisis were both recessions and bear markets. In 2011 there was an
unexpected and short-lived bear market that resulted in the overall industry ending the year flat.
Additionally, in 2015-2016 a stock market sell-off resulted in another bear market.
Finally, it is necessary to address the role risk plays in portfolio allocation. Equity funds
invest purely in stocks, which represent small ownership stakes in a company. Stocks often
generate dividends, which are small amounts of money paid yearly to investors. Alternatively,
fixed income funds invest in types of investment securities that pay a fixed interest payment until
a maturity date, at which point the principal investment amount is repaid. One of the
fundamental tradeoffs in finance is between risk and return: the greater the risk, the greater the
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return, but also the greater the possibility of loss. Investing in equity has a higher level of risk
than investing in fixed income, which means that it can either generate higher returns or larger
losses for the investor (Campbell, Viceira 2005). Traditional portfolio theory suggests reducing
risk through diversification (Sharpe, 1965). It is argued that portfolios with diversification of
different kinds of assets will on average yield higher and longer-term returns. The classic
portfolio diversification is a split between 40% fixed income and 60% equity. However, in
reality investors choose how to invest based on their risk profile – if they are able to tolerate
more risk they will invest more heavily in equities and if they want lower levels of risk they
invest more in fixed income. Investors who are older and closer to retirement generally tolerate
less risk and want safer investments, to ensure that they do not incur a significant loss in their
retirement portfolio just before retiring. Younger investors have more time to recover and thus
generally are able to tolerate more risk and can invest more heavily in equities.
Mutual funds are a specific type of financial asset that investors can buy. Firms will
generally offer many different types of mutual funds, each with different investing goals. This
allows them to cater to the varied risk tolerance potential investors may have. Each of the firms
discussed in this paper offer funds that invest in either pure equity, pure fixed income, or in a
blend that has a mix of equity and fixed income. While equity theoretically may allow for greater
returns, not every mutual fund invests in equity because there is a market for investors who want
to invest in fixed income or blended funds in order to mitigate the risk level of their portfolio.

4. Data Overview
The following sections provide an overview of the data components in this paper.
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4.1. Mutual Funds
Overall, the mutual fund industry in the United States has hovered at approximately eight
thousand mutual funds from 2000 to 2019 (Rudden 2020) as shown in Figure 1

Figure 1

These funds are sold by several large companies who offer a variety of fund types for
investors to choose from. Because these funds are available for direct investment by anyone in
the public, details about management, investment choices, returns and other metrics of financial
performance must be made publicly available through fact sheets and prospectus forms listed on
the company’s website. The data for this paper is composed of 133 randomly selected mutual
funds drawn from several top financial firms. The data includes fund information for all years
between 2000 and 2019 for each of the randomly selected funds.
I have selected only funds that have complete data from 2000 to 2019. These funds are
likely more stable due to their age. This paper does not analyze funds that completely liquidated
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during this time period, which could occur for reasons such as bankruptcy. This creates a
selection bias, as I am only analyzing funds managed well enough to avoid bankruptcy. I also do
not analyze newer funds that came into existence after 2000.

4.2. Female Managers
The central assumption of this paper is that the level of female managers in the mutual
fund industry has remained constant between 2000 and 2019. The literature backs up this
assumption on both a global and national level. Globally, from 2000 to 2019, the percentage of
managers of mutual funds that are women was 14%, according to an analysis by financial
reporting giant Morningstar. This number was even smaller for the United States, where only
11% of managers were women across all funds (Lallos 2020). This industry trend informed the
collection of the data for this paper. As manager data for each year from 2000 to 2019 was not
easily accessible information for each fund in this data set, the percent breakdown of gender on a
management team as well as the presence of a woman on the team is held constant. The listed
number of women on the management team at the end of 2019 is used as the constant for each
year between 2000 and 2019.

4.3. Capital Asset Pricing Model
In order to effectively measure returns both within and across asset classes it is necessary
to control them against a benchmark. A useful model in financial economics to measure returns
is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM):
!! = !" + $! %!# − !" '

(1)

!! represents the return of security i. !# is the return of the market and is greater than the
return of the risk-free rate !" . This model implies that a security’s return has a linear relationship
to the additional return generated by the market over the risk-free rate captured as the
12

()*+ +-./01.023 $! . This model assumes %!# − !" ' is positive over long periods, as
confirmed by observation in the market (Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe 2009). However, during a bear
market, the term %!# − !" ' may become negative and this has an impact on interpretation of $!
which is discussed in section 5.1.
The CAPM model has been modified in order to create Jensen’s alpha (Hamilton, Hoje,
Statman, 1993). Jensen’s alpha is used by financial economists to measure excess returns. The
general model for this is:
!! − !" = 4! + $!$ %!$ − !" ' + 5%

(2)

Where !$ is the monthly return on a benchmark market portfolio and !" is risk-free
monthly return. $!$ is the proportion of fund i’s return related to the benchmark. The expected
value of the residual return is 4! , which is constant. 5% represents the deviation of the residual
return from the mean. The dependent, !! − !" represents the risk adjusted return as it describes
the return of mutual fund i minus the risk-free rate. Additionally, it is important to note that the
4! or “alpha” for each fund is the mathematical representation of a “trading edge.” It
demonstrates the skill active investors have over a passive investment in the market. By
adjusting for risk in finding the excess performance represented by !! − !" , increases in alpha
represent increasing returns without additional risk, which is ideal for a fund. Jensen’s alpha
measures a fund manager’s performance controlling for the returns of the S&P 500 and the riskfree US 3-month Treasury Bill.

4.4. Summary Statistics
To create the data set to study this industry, I collected data on management experience,
team size, and gender as well as the returns for each fund. I also collected the percentage of
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women on the management team, which I define as *23+6789:26. I then created a dummy
variable called 89:;6 that captures whether each fund has a woman on their management
team. Additional dummy variables include <=>-6?, which represents funds invested only in
equity; >@>-6?, which represents funds only invested in fixed income; and A.26?2?, which
represents funds that contain a mix of both equity and fixed income. The variable )B<C1
represents the combined average experience of a management team. D2;:E0F2 represents the
number of managers in the management team. I took the logs of these two variables, represented
by .7)B7<C1 and .7D2;:E0F2, in order to measure the effects as a percentage. Using a version
of CAPM discussed later in the model section, I created a multiplier called ()*+ +-./01.023,
that controls a funds return against the S&P 500 and the three-month US T-Bill. Table 2 contains
the relative summary statistics.

14
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4.5. Returns and CAPM Multiplier
Table 3 demonstrates the average returns for the mutual funds in the data set, the average
CAPM multiplier across those same funds, the S&P 500 and the US T-Bill returns from 2000 to
2019.

The )B23;72 !2/-36 represents the average return for the given year across all mutual
funds in the data set. The ()*+ +-./01.023 is the average returns generated for all the funds
using the modified CAPM discussed in section 4.3. Comparing the
)B23;72 !2/-36 and /ℎ2 ()+* +-./01.023 to the S&P 500 and the three-month US Treasury
Bill demonstrates the variations between risk-adjusted returns and raw returns against both the
risk filled stock market represented by the S&P 500 and the risk-free US Treasury Bill. The US
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Treasury Bill is considered risk free as the only risk of loss would come from the defaulting of
the US government, which financial markets consider extremely unlikely. As discussed in the
theory section, with greater risk there are greater returns. The lack of risk in US Treasury Bills is
demonstrated by the small fluctuations between years in returns, and the fact that returns never
drop below zero. The S&P 500 has more risk as it is composed of companies whose performance
could lead to either great loss or great returns. This is demonstrated in the large differences in
returns between years, with losses as much as 38.49% and gains as strong as 28.88% in
comparison with the much smaller fluctuations in the US Treasury Bill. The column (!& − !" )
measures the difference between the S&P 500 (!& ) and the US Treasury Bill (!" ) and is the
denominator used to adjust for risk levels to create the CAPM Multiplier. While both the
)B23;72 !2/-36 and ()*+ +-./01.023 involve risk, the ()*+ +-./01.023 measures
performance adjusted against the risk levels of the S&P 500 and the US-Treasury Bill, and thus
leads to generally lower fluctuations in returns.

5. Model
5.1. CAPM Multiplier
Before describing the details of the model, I need to expand on the CAPM model and
how I am using it to measure the effectiveness of fund managers during market downturns.
Equation (1) can be rewritten as shown:
()*+ +-./01.023 = (!!' − !"' )/(!&' − !"' )

(3)

With !!' standing for the annual returns of each individual fund, !"' for the annual
returns of the US T-Bill, and !&' for the annual returns of the S&P 500. The ()*+ +-./01.023
I am using as the dependent variable measures returns with respect to the market gain relative to
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the market risk-free gain. I use the S&P 500 and the three-month US T-Bill as the market gain
and market risk free gain respectively. By controlling the annual returns of a fund against both
the S&P 500 and the US T-Bill equation (3) represents the difference between active
management and funds that are fully indexed.
It is necessary to understand how Jensen’s alpha fits into this model. Note that when there
is a bear market, the assumption that %!# − !" ' is positive no longer holds (see Table 3). In
terms of equation (2), the proportion of the fund tied to the market $!$ has a larger impact on the
residual returns than the constant 4! . This means the managers of the fund must create a negative
()*+ +-./01.023 in order to generate positive returns. Thus, for the purpose of this paper I am
using the ()*+ +-./01.023 as the key component in measuring performance of the fund
managers, especially in bear markets. Table 3 summarizes the results of computing the
()*+ +-./01.023 for each of the funds and its average across the funds for every year in the
dataset.

5.2. Model Details
Previous literature demonstrates the positive effect the presence of women in a team can
have financially (See: Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, and Praag 2013). I place this question within
the mutual fund industry during periods of market downturn. I investigate if the simple presence
as well as percentage of women managers running a mutual fund has an impact on returns,
especially during recessions. In order to do this, I break down the measurement of returns against
the percentage of women managers and women managers as a dummy variable into several
regressions.
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First, I measure this effect in the aggregate by measuring performance across all years
looking at both the percentage of women managers as well as the presence of a woman on the
management team. The model to measure this can be explained in the following two equations:
()*+ +-./01.023
= $( + $) *23+6789:26 + $* .7)B7<C1 + $+ .7D2;:E0F2

(4)

+ $, <K-0/L + M
()*+ +-./01.023
= $( + $) 89:;6 + $* .7)B7<C1 + $+ .7D2;:E0F2 + $, <K-0/L + M

(5)

*23+6789:26 measures the percentage of women in a team for each fund held
constant over the 20-year period. 89:;6 is a dummy variable where 1 represents a fund
management team having at least one woman on their team. .7)B7<C1 measures the log of the
average experience of each team for each fund. It is likely that greater experience may make it
easier to spot opportunities in the market. Additionally, it is also possible for those newer to the
industry to bring in a fresh perspective that is useful to the team. .7D2;:E0F2, which measures
the log of the size of each team for each fund, is also necessary to analyze as bigger teams have
more eyes to see market opportunities and bring different perspectives and experiences to the
table. Finally, <K-0/L represents the percentage of assets invested in equity. Only the percentage
of equity is necessary to demonstrate the fund allocation between equity and fixed income given
that they total 100%. It is likely that the greater the amount of assets invested into equity, the
greater the returns on the aggregate are. The reason for this is that equity generally involves
greater risk and thus greater return potential. The addition of <K-0/L here helps to control for the
goals of funds as some seek to invest more heavily in either equity or fixed income in order to
offer investors a variety based on their risk profiles.
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Given the importance of <K-0/L in returns, I run a regression where funds are separated
by asset classes. This is done by adding in dummy variables where funds are separated out into
either pure equity, pure fixed income, or blended funds. The variables added to the regression are
<=>-6? and A.26?2? which measure performance relative to fixed income funds. This also
measures performance across all years. The two regression equations for this are as follows:
()*+ +-./01.023
= $( + $) *23+6789:26(.) + $* .7)B7<C1(.) + $+ .7D2;:E0F2(.)

(6)

+ $, <=>-6? + $0 A.26?2? + M
()*+ +-./01.023
= $( + $) 89:;6(.) + $* .7)B7<C1(.) + $+ .7D2;:E0F2(.)

(7)

+ $, <=>-6? + $0 A.26?2? + M
This captures the effect of female managers both as a percentage and as a dummy
variable for a given asset class. Controlling for asset class reveals the relationship between
managers and their skill as opposed to simply reflecting the risk and return trade-off. The returns
of equity, blended, and fixed income funds are not directly comparable due to the fact that their
different risk levels lead to very different ranges of potential returns. For example, an equity fund
is able to earn significantly more returns than a fixed income fund due to the fact it carries more
risk. By separating out funds into their asset classes, I am able to control for this effect and thus
am able to examine the relationship between returns and the impact of female managers.
Finally, I run additional regressions measuring the effects during recessions and bear
markets while continuing to control for asset allocation. This allows me to analyze more
specifically the relationship between returns and women managers during recessionary and nonrecessionary periods. This model is as follows:
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()*+ +-./01.023
= $( + $) *23+6789:26(.) + $* .7)B7<C1(.') + $+ .7D2;:E0F2(.')

(8)

+ +$, <=>-6?' + $0 A.26?2?' + M
()*+ +-./01.023
= $( + $) 89:;6(.') + $* .7)B7<C1(.') + $+ .7D2;:E0F2(.')

(9)

+ $, <=>-6?' + $0 A.26?2?' + M
.7)B7<C1 represents the log of the average years of experience in the industry of the
team for an individual mutual fund. I expect that the higher the average experience of the team,
the higher the returns. <=>-6? is a dummy variable that represents funds invested purely in
equity. A.26?2? is a dummy variable that represents funds invested in both equity and fixed
income. It is likely that the greater the amount of assets invested into equity, the greater the
returns are. By using dummy variables, the goals of funds are controlled. Each of the variables
are measured at t specific year levels controlling for asset class c. Each t time period chosen will
reflect either a recessionary period, a bear market, or non-recessionary period for comparison. In
order to measure time period, the variable Bear Market is used in the regression through an “if
statement” command. Bear Market is a dummy variable where years in which a bear market
occurred equals 1 and is used in the regression through an “if statement” command. All
recessionary periods are also bear markets but there are additional bear markets that did not
develop into recessions; therefore, the variable Bear Market is able to represent both of these
periods of economic down markets.

6. Results
The results for each of the regressions are in line with previous literature. There is no
statistically significant impact of women managers both as a percentage and as a dummy variable
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on returns in any of the regressions. I breakdown the regressions into two sections that first
measure the impact of female managers in the aggregate and then measure the results in downmarkets compared to up-markets.

6.1. Results in the Aggregate
Table 4 looks at the effects of *23+6789:26 and 89:;6 on the ()*+ +-./01.023
in the aggregate. The first two regressions measure these effects in the aggregate without
controlling fund type. The variable <K-0/L measures the impact of the amount of equity a fund
has on the ()*+ +-./01.023. Regressions three and four measure the aggregate effects while
controlling for fund type using the dummy variables <=>-6? and A.26?2?. *23+6789:26
and 89:;6, measuring the effect of female managers as a percentage and as a presence
respectively, are not statistically significant in any of the four regressions. The log of )B<C1,
measured by .7)B7<C1, is statistically significant at the 5% level and has a negative impact on
returns in each regression. <K-0/L – the specific levels of equity each firm possess – is also
statistically significant and has a small positive impact on returns. Similarly, the dummy
variables <=>-6? and A.26?2? are also statistically significant and positively impact returns.
This is in line with the literature, as the greater risk equity represents generally leads to higher
returns. In line with this, funds that are pure equity (<=>-6?) have a larger positive impact on
returns then funds with some level of fixed income (A.26?2?).
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6.2. Down and Up Markets Compared
Table 5 compares the returns of the ()*+ +-./01.023 in both down and up market
years. One concern is that there are only a few down-market periods in the years between 2000
and 2019. The smaller number of observations in down markets limits the explanatory power of
the results for regressions for recessionary data. The easiest way to increase this explanatory
power is to increase the number of funds in the dataset, something that would be useful for
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additional research. As in the aggregate, neither the percentage (*23+6789:26) nor mere
presence of women managers (89:;6) are statistically significant. The log of average
experience (.7)B7<C1) has a statistically significant negative impact on the ()*+ +-./01.023
throughout both down and up market years. During down-market periods, this effect is more
pronounced. The negative effect of increased experience seems counterintuitive, suggesting that
perhaps measuring experience by taking the average of the experience of each team member is
not the best way to measure experience. A fund being equity, as measured by <=>-6?, is also
statistically significant at the 5% level and has a positive impact on returns during recessionary
periods. A fund being a mixture of equity and fixed income, measured by A.26?2?, is
statistically significant during down-market periods and has a positive impact on returns.
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As demonstrated in Tables 4 and 5, women as both a percentage (*23+6789:26) and
as a dummy variable (89:;6) have no statistically significant results. This is in line with
previous literature that demonstrated that female managers had no statistically significant impact
on European mutual fund returns. Another notable result comes from .7)B7<C1 and )B7<C1.
Both these variables have a statistically significant result and had a negative impact on returns –
something that is not intuitive. By taking the log, the results indicate that an increase in the
percentage change in experience of a team leads to lower returns. This effect is especially
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pronounced during recessionary periods. The results for .7)B7<C1 seem counterintuitive. I had
expected that as average experience increases, there would be a positive impact on returns. In
both table 4 and table 5 however, average experience has a negative impact, and it is particularly
pronounced during recessions. Finally, the !* and adjusted !* for each of the eight regressions
are lower than results from previous literature. The study of European equity funds had an
adjusted !* of 0.94 (Babalos, Caporale, Philippas 2015). The difference in these !* results may
come from the fact that this research expands the types of mutual funds studied from pure equity
funds to include blended and fixed income.
In order to test if there was a problem with the variable .7)B7<C1 itself, I took the
standard deviation of the years of experience for each management team. Table 7 in the
Appendix shows these standard deviations for each firm and fund. The standard deviations for
each fund have a large spread, with the minimum being 0 and the maximum being 23.335. This
suggests that using the average experience is not the best way to capture the effect of years of
experience of the fund managers. For further research, I would suggest breaking down funds into
classes of experience based on standard deviation ranges. This was not possible with this dataset
as this would have resulted in too few observations to make any meaningful interpretation of
experience on performance.
Given this significant level of variation in average experience, I re-ran regressions five
through eight using a new variable called +;C<C1. This variable captures the effect of the
person with the highest level of experience on the team. In these regressions, <=>-6? remained
statistically significant with a large positive effect during down market periods but had a small
statistically significant negative impact during up markets. A.26?2? was only statistically
significant during recessionary periods and had a large positive impact. Both *23+6789:26,
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89:;6, and D2;:E0F2 remained statistically insignificant across all years. Unlike .7)B7<C1,
+;C<C1 was only statistically significant during recessionary periods and had a very small
negative impact. The !* and adjusted !* continued to be smaller than in previous literature. This
does suggest that there is in fact some correlation between increased experience and a funds
financial performance, however, this effect likely would be best captured through separating the
average experience of all teams into classes based on the standard deviation of experience levels
within the team.
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6.3. Correlation Analysis
The variables that should theoretically impact returns may also be highly correlated with
each other, which could result in the problem of multicollinearity. Table 6 represents the results
for the correlation test for multicollinearity.

Table 6 breaks down the correlations between the ()*+ +-./01.023, *23+6789:26,
89:;6, <K-0/L, >@ O6P9:2, <= >-6?, >@ Q-6?, A.26?2?, D2;: E0F2, )B7<C1, .7D2;:E0F2
and .7)B7<C1. The variables that represent years, including bear markets and recessions have
been removed. None of these variables are highly correlated with the ()*+ +-./01.023, which
is consistent for each of the variables except for )B<C1 and .7)B7<C1 as well as
<K-0/L, <=Q-6? and A.26?2?. 89:;6 and *23+6789:26 are highly and positively
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correlated, which supports the logic for separating these variables into separate regressions. Both
D2;:E0F2 and the .7D2;:E0F2 have a small correlation effect with the variable 89:;6.
<K-0/L has a very strong negative correlation with >0C2? O6P9:2 and negative correlation with
>C>-6?. Equity holds greater risk and therefore greater reward potential (captured through
returns) while fixed income holds less risk and less potential reward. Equity and fixed income
have inverse return potentials due to these different levels of risk the assets hold. The strong
negative correlation (-0.995) between the variables <K-0/L and >0C2? O6P9:2 is captured in
Table 6. As returns attributed to equity increase, the impact of returns attributed to fixed income
on the overall returns of a portfolio decreases.

7. Conclusion
Measuring female managers as both a percent (*23+6789:26) and a dummy variable
(89:;6) captures the effects of female managers both in higher percentages and as simply
being present on a management team. These results in each of the regressions were not
statistically different from zero, demonstrating that mutual fund management teams with women
perform no better or worse than funds with more men on the team. The fact that someone is a
woman does not contribute to trading edge or cause any difference in performance compared to
men. My empirical results demonstrate that other factors may contribute to a fund’s trading edge,
such as the average experience of the team, but does not offer any additional insights into what
may impact an individual’s trading edge. The lack of difference in performance between funds
with female managers compared to male managers suggests that gender is not an issue in causing
underperformance in the mutual fund industry. However, the fact that gender is not an issue in
fund underperformance does not explain why the number of women in the mutual fund industry
remained stagnant over the past 20 years. Rationally, gender should not be a decision factor for
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firms, suggesting that there must be additional issues causing the low and stagnant participation
of women in the mutual fund industry. A potential argument about women having less
experience would also not explain this effect, as the regressions demonstrate that increasing
experience has a negative relationship with returns. As discussed in the literature review, Goldin
writes about hidden factors that cause gender gaps in labor force participation. While not the
focus of this paper, further research tying Goldin’s theories into the mutual fund industry could
yield insights into the stagnant female participation rate. Given the existence and purpose of
organizations such as those mentioned in the introduction – Girls Who Invest and SEO – it is
also possible that a lack of internship training and issues with recruitment contribute to this
gender gap. This suggests that there is a labor supply issue rather than an issue of labor demand.
Additionally, it is possible that there are positive impacts on a fund and on a firm that come with
hiring more women managers, such as the ability to attract additional clients. Further research
into how women contribute to client recruitment could potentially demonstrate incentives to help
firms overcome the hidden factors leading to such low and stagnant levels of female participation
in the industry.
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